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Abstract 
After World War II, every country that had been touched by or involved in the war had to 
come to terms with its past. In the case of Switzerland, the Swiss government, the army and 
some of the country’s leadership established a strong official historical memory of the war, 
portraying Switzerland as a neutral, benevolent and well-fortified country that remained 
innocent and untouched by the war.  
From the 1960s onwards, Swiss artists and intellectuals challenged these myths by 
presenting alternative views of the Swiss past in their work. Beginning in the 1970s, Swiss 
historians published an increasing amount of scholarly research concerning Switzerland’s 
World War II past, and challenging the official historical memory promoted by the 
government. 
In the 1990s, after the discovery of thousands of dormant Swiss bank accounts containing 
Holocaust assets, Switzerland was forced to adopt a more realistic memory of its involvement 
in World War II. An Independent Commission of Experts, established by the Swiss 
government, conducted thorough research about Switzerland’s wartime involvement and 
published its Final Report in 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Switzerland, collective memory, World War II, national myths. 
5 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Over the years after World War II almost every country involved or touched by the war had 
its own way of dealing with the past. Some nations, like Germany, could not deny the 
immense guilt and responsibility that weighed heavily on the German people. Germany 
would spend decades dealing with the deeds committed by National Socialists and seeking 
reconciliation with their victims. Germany’s World War II history was an “unmasterable 
past.”1 The effects of the dismemberment of Germany—as a consequence of Germany's war 
guilt—are still noticeable today, 20 years after the reunification. For many other countries, 
however, the lines between being guilty and being a victim were not clear cut. Austria, for 
example, held on for two generations to the myth constructed after the war of having been 
„Hitler’s first victim“ Only in the early 1990s did the Austrian government officially admit to 
their share of responsibility for Nazi war crimes committed during WWII.
2
  
Due to growing international pressure in the 1990s, Switzerland also, a small country 
in the heart of Europe, had to go through a historical paradigm shift. For years Switzerland 
had been depicting itself as a completely neutral country, not involved in the war, surviving 
the cauldron of war raging around its borders without being invaded. The Swiss had 
convinced themselves that it was the strength of their unity and will (Willensnation) and the 
force of their army that repelled potential invaders. The lead article by Pierre Béguin, chief 
editor of the Gazette de Lausanne on 9 January 1946, expresses this sentiment accurately: 
Ce qu’il y a surtout de réconfortant en tout cela, c’est que les réflexes nationaux 
de notre people tout entier ont admirablent joué. […] Les Suisses étaient trop 
sains d’esprit et trop attachés aux valeurs sur lesquelles ils ont édifié leur 
                                                 
1
 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); see also Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two 
Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
2
 Gunter Bischof, “Victims? Perpetrators? “Punching Bags” of European Historical Memory? The Austrians and 
Their World War II Legacies,” German Studies Review, no. 27 (2004), 17-32. 
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communauté nationale pour se laisser impressionner ou se laisser séduire. A 
quelques exceptions près – qui concernent des trublions et des dévoyés – ils n’ont 
pas chancelé. […] Et c’est ainsi que cette page de notre histoire qui aurait pu 
être la plus sombre a été en vérité l’une des plus claires. Il en ira ainsi à l’avenir 
également, face à d’autres dangers, si nous restons fidèles à nous-mêmes, si nos 
reflexes nationaux jouent avec la même perfection.
3
 
According to Béguin, Switzerland’s sound national reflexes, her sanity and her attachment to 
values protected the country from invasion and helped her survive – what Hobsbawm calls 
the “era of catastrophes” (Zeitalter der Katastrophe)4 – surprisingly well. Switzerland 
appeared to have been spared from the turmoil and atrocities of World War II. The hardy 
Swiss people seemed to have emerged stronger than ever after a war in a European world 
ruined and tattered by the war. This perspective stood in the long tradition of Swiss 
historiography depicting Switzerland as an exceptional nation and a special case (Sonderfall).  
In this view Switzerland was different due to its political culture of direct democracy, 
federalism, tradition of neutrality, and its multi-ethnic composition and multilingual culture.
5
 
These national traits made Switzerland different from any other country of the world. The 
country’s position as a peaceful and self-contained island in the middle of war-tormented 
Europe seemed to enforce this view even further.  
 In the past few years, however, the question of Switzerland’s role and involvement in 
World War II suddenly became a focus of national and international attention and criticism. 
Thousands of dormant bank accounts of holocaust victims raised the question whether 
Switzerland’s idealized self-image was merely a cover-up for a more shady and sordid past. It 
precipitated a national identity crisis in a country with a strong sense of itself; the concept of 
the Sonderfall Switzerland seemed exposed as a myth. In the course of this serious crisis, the 
                                                 
3
 Pierre Béguin, Gazette de Lausanne, January 9, 1946: 
http://www.letempsarchives.ch/Default/Skins/LeTempsFr/Client.asp?Skin=LeTempsFr&enter=true&AW=1318
877999656&AppName=2 (accessed October 23, 2011). 
4
 Eric Hobsbawm, Zeitalter der Extreme in Markus Furrer, Die Nation im Schulbuch (Hannover: Verlag 
Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2004),  234. 
5
 See Paul Widmer, Die Schweiz als Sonderfall  
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Swiss government ordered in 1996 the creation of an International Commission of Experts 
(ICE), headed by the noted Swiss historian Jean-Francois Bergier (“Bergier Commission”).  
For the first time the relationship between Switzerland and Nazi Germany before, during, and 
after World War II was critically and independently researched and evaluated by expert 
historians. The commission’s report published in 2002 painted a rather different picture of 
Switzerland’s involvement in World War II than had been portrayed in the decades following 
the war. Switzerland had compromised its neutral position during the war by secretly 
cooperating with the Nazis especially in the economic arena and by closing its doors to 
refugees from Nazi Germany. The deconstruction of national myths dear to the Swiss people 
was a very painful. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to establish what exactly the Swiss did or did not do 
during World War II. Rather I want to analyse how the war has been remembered in 
Switzerland. The study of memory is not about whether the country’s behaviour during the 
war was complicit, or pragmatic and understandable, but rather to comprehend the dialectic 
between remembering and forgetting, emphasizing and concealing certain historical events. I 
am also interested in the players, mechanisms and implications involved in the process of 
constructing a national memory.
6
 It is vital to understand the difference between actual 
historical facts and how nations remember them, acknowledging the historical truth 
irrevocably connecting memory and historical facts. In the eyes of later generations, past 
events happened the way they have been remembered and told in the national historical 
narrative.  
The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyze how the collective Swiss national 
memory of World War II was constructed, maintained and modified by a handful of national 
leaders in the decades following World War II. I will establish an outline of Switzerland’s 
                                                 
6
 David Cesarani, foreword to Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2000), ix. 
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involvement, position and role during World War and how they were remembered after 1945, 
the players who were in the forefront of shaping the Swiss collective memory of the war, and 
the consequences the different ways of remembering ultimately had on Switzerland. I will 
conclude that, for the most part, the Swiss collective memory of World War II was shaped by 
pragmatic leaders due to political necessity dictating these historical constructions.   
Contemporary politics at any given time instrumentalized these myths. I will also highlight 
how public officials, historians and the media fit the trajectory of World War II into a long 
tradition of Swiss history built on a few key myths of national identity.  It was this official 
pragmatism that militated against a balanced Swiss historical narrative of its World War II 
involvement and interaction with the outside world. Swiss historical consciousness has been 
based on the myth of keeping a distance to the outside world: 
Bremsend [gegen eine Öffnung der Schweiz] wirkt dabei oft der während 
Jahrzehnten gehegte Mythos des “Abseitsstehens” mit der Überzeugung, dass 
man besser fährt, wenn man sich aus allem heraushält. Da genügt auch nicht die 
Erkenntnis der Historikerinnen und Historiker, dass die historische Wahrheit 
anders aussieht. Zu stark sind solche Vorstellungen mit der nationalen Identität 
verknüpft und Teil eines Geschichtsbewusstseins.
7
 
I will conclude my thesis with a brief discussion about the reasons why it is important to 
study the history of memory, particularly in the case of Switzerland. 
 
2. Theories of Historical Memory 
2.1. Maurice Halbwachs 
The beginning of the concept of collective memory lies with the French philosopher and 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. In his book On Collective Memory he defines collective 
                                                 
7
 Furrer, 11. 
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memory as a flexible, constantly changing and socially constructed idea. Although 
remembering is still an individual act, it is influenced by the collective of a group or society 
as a whole and individual people are drawing on society to remember:  
Yet it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories. […] It is in this 
sense that there exists a collective memory and social framework for memory; it 
is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and 
participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.
8
 
Collective memory, according to Halbwachs, is as impermanent and changing as society. As 
an example he mentions how the constructed image and memory that the medieval pilgrims 
had of Jerusalem was entirely different from the image other pilgrims cultivated at another 
time in history. Yet these differences in collective memory are not random, but directly 
influenced by the current situation the memory is constructed in:  
For Halbwachs, the past is a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by 
the concerns of the present. He argues that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of 
the present shape the various views of the past as they are manifested respectively 
in every historical epoch.
9
 
How the memory of the past is directly influenced by the needs of the present can also 
be observed in Switzerland’s history: In the summer of 1940, almost a year after the invasion 
of Poland through the German and Soviet armies, things did not look good for Switzerland – 
located in the heart of Europe between neighboring Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, France 
and Italy. Within two months (April and May 1940), the Axis powers invaded Denmark, 
Norway, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  The Swiss people became 
more and more convinced that they might be next and suffer a similar fate before too long. In 
this environment, General Henry Guisan, commander-in-chief of the Swiss army during 
World War II delivered a speech at the strategically chosen location of the Rütli. In this 
legendary meadow in the center of Switzerland the first three Swiss cantons purportedly 
                                                 
8
 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38. 
9
 Lewis A. Coser, introduction to On Collective Memory, by Maurice Halbwachs, 25. 
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signed a document of mutual assistance in 1291. This event is remembered as standing at the 
beginning of Switzerland as a nation. Guisan’s speech, not only because of his eloquence, but 
also because of the choice of the historical location, was a strong indication of  Swiss 
resistance to potential Nazi depredations and has been remembered as such ever since. What 
the Swiss needed at this point in time, was to be encouraged and assured that they would 
survive this menacing international situation.  So General Guisan was a “true master of 
historical ceremony who in the most desperate situations evoked the past as a compelling 
metaphor for contemporary events.”10 He used the founding myth of the Swiss nation as 
historical ‘proof’ that it was possible to withstand overwhelming enemies and thus retain 
freedom and independence.  
According to Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory, the same story about the 
foundation of Switzerland could, at a different time and under different circumstances, be 
used to ‘remember’ a completely different aspect of Swiss history. Therefore, a study on the 
Swiss memory of World War II during the post-war period is as much a study on the history 
of the post-war period itself as it is a study of the historical events of the World War II: 
Hier wird klar, dass Erinnern kein Zustand ist, sondern Bewegung und mit 
Geschichte ebenso viel zu tun hat wie mit Gegenwart. Erinnerungen werden 
gemacht und zwar im Moment des Erzählens und aus ihm heraus.
11
 
2.2. Pierre Nora 
Pierre Nora, a French historian whose work on memory and identity is considered 
fundamental in France, compares and contrasts the notion of collective memory with the 
concept of history:  
                                                 
10
 Regula Ludi, “What Is So Special about Switzerland?,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ed. 
Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudia Fogu (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 211. 
11
 Daniel de Falco, Der kleine Bund, 15. Februar 2003. http://www.archimob.ch/arc/livre/index_ger.php 
(accessed October 18, 2011).  
11 
 
  
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in 
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. 
History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and 
incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a 
bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.
12
 
In his description of memory Nora makes reference to Halbwachs’ theory that collective 
memory is shaped by the concerns of the present. While history tries to rationally reconstruct 
what happened in the past, memory is an organic process that, according to Nora, happens in 
the present by way of the so-called lieux de mémoire. These “places of remembrance” can be 
physical locations, such as a museums or sculptures, or events, abstract ideas, or institutions. 
In the case of Switzerland, important lieux de mémoire are what Markus Furrer calls Swiss 
historical “myths,” around which the Swiss construct their national identity.13 They are places 
or concepts explicitly dedicated to the memory of a certain event, and therefore the product of 
a lack of spontaneous memory, according to Nora: 
Lieu de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, 
that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize 
celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no 
longer occur naturally.
14
 
An example for this theory would be the recent oral history project “Archimob” in 
Switzerland, conducted under the title L’histoire, c’est moi: 555 Versionen der Schweizer 
Geschichte 1939-1945. The project collected 555 interviews with people who had 
experienced World War II in Switzerland and asked them about their “personal, special and 
ordinary experiences in the time between 1939 and 1945.”15  
                                                 
12
 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, Representations, no. 26 (1989), 
http://www.sfu.ca/media-lab/archive/2007/487/Resources/Readings/Nora_between%20memory.pdf (accessed 
October 23, 2011). 
13
 See Markus Furrer, Die Nation im Schulbuch. 
14
 Nora, Between Memory and History. 
15
 Archimob. http://www.archimob.ch/d/ausstellung.html (accessed October 16, 2011). 
12 
 
  
Interpreted according to Nora, this brilliant project only happened because there is no 
room anymore for the production of spontaneous memory in Swiss society, and an official 
archive has to be set up to conserve these individual testimonies. The multitude of lieux de 
mémoire in Switzerland – actual places like the Rütli as well as abstract concepts like Swiss 
neutrality – leads us therefore to the conclusion that the formation of a completely free and 
spontaneous individual memory culture did not happen in Switzerland.  
It seems like Switzerland’s handling of World War II would be an example of what 
Nora calls the acceleration of history, which he describes as “an increasingly rapid slippage 
of the present into a historical past that is gone for good,”16 which leaves neither time nor 
space for the remembrance of an event. However, considering Nora’s definition of history as 
an intellectual construct and reconstruction of the past, we come to the conclusion that it is –
not possible to talk about an acceleration of history in the case of Switzerland’s dealing with 
World War II. In fact, what happened is the institutional construction of an official memory 
of World War II soon after the war, consciously highlighting aspects of the war that were in 
line with the national self-image and omitting facts that were perceived as ill-suited for the 
concerns of the post-war period. The Bonjour affair is an example for this (described in more 
detail in chapter 4). As this institutionally constructed memory does neither fall into the 
category of collective memory, nor of factual history, I am using the term “public memory” 
where needed. “Public memory” is referring to the version of memory dominating in the 
public, which can, but does not have to, be memory constructed institutionally in order to 
serve political needs.
17
 
                                                 
16
 Nora, Between Memory and History. 
17
 Luc van Dongen, “Swiss Memory of the Second World War in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-48,” in 
Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 261. 
13 
 
  
2.3. Jan Assmann 
Jan Assmann’s reflections on the different types of memory form an important addition to 
studies of historical memory developed by Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. Assmann, a 
German historian of ancient Egypt, makes the important distinction between what he calls 
communicative memory and cultural memory, which differ in the first place in their distance 
in time to the actual event. Communicative memory only stretches as far as we can find 
contemporary witnesses to a certain event: 
Its most important characteristic is its limited temporal horizon. As all oral 
history studies suggest, this horizon does not extend more than eighty to (at the 
very most) one hundred years into the past, which equals three or four 
generations…18 
Following this time span of up to one hundred years we find a different type of memory, 
which Assmann calls cultural memory. Cultural memory is not only different in its distance 
to the event and the fact that it does not change with time, but also in its function. Assmann 
isolated six main characteristics of which I am going to choose the three most relevant to the 
analysis of Swiss memory of World War II.  
First, there is the concretion of identity through cultural memory, which “preserves 
the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and 
peculiarity.”19 He points out that such a concretion of memory creates a sharp distinction 
between the “us” and the “them.” In the case of Switzerland such a concretion of identity 
through cultural memory can be seen in the context of Switzerland’s self-image as a small yet 
powerful state. This essential aspect of Swiss identity is upheld and perpetuated through the 
cultivation of the memory of important events in Swiss history that exemplify and therefore 
preserve the notion of being a “mighty dwarf.” Examples for this would be the 
                                                 
18
 Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, no. 65 (1995), 
http://www.let.uu.nl/~Elena.Carrillo/personal/LITERATURA%20Y%20GUERRA%20CIVIL/ARTICULOS/As
smann.pdf (accessed October 23, 2011). 
19
 Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity. 
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commemoration of the “Rütlischwur”, a declaration of mutual assistance and independence of 
the three first Swiss cantons as “ein einzig Volk von Brüdern,” as Schiller expressed it, every 
year on August 1. Another example would be the remembrance of the “Schlacht von 
Sempach” (battle of Sempach) in 1386, which is regarded as the highlight of the separation of 
the Swiss from the Habsburgs. The undersized peasant army of the Swiss Confederation 
emerged victorious in this crucial battle and turning point in Swiss history. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the memory of Sempach was used again to substantiate the idea of Swiss 
independence and military victory achieved again against overwhelming odds. 
A second characteristic of cultural memory, according to Assmann, is its capacity to 
reconstruct. This aspect is very closely linked to Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of the past as a 
construct according to the needs of the present. Assmann differentiates between two possible 
existences of cultural memory: first in the form of accumulated sources and pieces of 
memory like texts and images “act[ing] as a total horizon” and comprehending all potential 
interpretation of this material; and second in the form of a form of individual memory -- an 
“actuality, whereby each contemporary puts the objectivized meaning into its own 
perspective, giving it its own relevance.”20 
A third characteristic mentioned by Assmann – organization – lies in the realm of 
language. Cultural memory brings about a certain institutionalization of communication: it 
not only reduces the communicative situation – to a degree – to a formula, but also is 
specialized in the “bearers of cultural memory.”21 This essentially describes the influence of 
culture on the language, which results in a canonized and specified use of the language, 
shaped through a society’s cultural memory. 
                                                 
20
 Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity. 
21
 Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity. 
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2.4. Theory of Memory Regarding Switzerland 
What, then, are the concepts that can be applied from these theories of historical memory to 
the case study of Switzerland’s memory of World War II? Most useful for the Swiss case 
study is Maurice Halbwachs’ theory that collective memory is a flexible construct, shaped by 
the concerns of the present. It implies that memory can also be understood as a political tool, 
if used consciously. Pierre Nora’s theory on the lieux de mémoire is also useful, especially in 
the context of what Markus Furrer calls national myths, which can be understood as abstract 
lieux de mémoire. Also, Nora’s notion of the acceleration of history will be an important part 
of the analysis of the collective memory constructed during the immediate post-war area. 
Finally, Jan Assmann’s cultural memory with its characteristics, especially his thoughts on 
the function of collective memory in relation to the concretion of identity, will play an 
important role in the analysis of the development of Swiss collective memory of World War 
II. 
3. The Immediate Post-war Period:  Collective 
Memory Construction 
3.1. The Geistige Landesverteidigung and its Consequences 
Already before World War II was unleashed in Europe in 1939, Switzerland felt an urgent 
need to protect its identity, its national interests and its sovereignty against the rising tide of 
National Socialism in Germany. Adolf Hitler had seized dictatorial powers in the spring of 
1933. He consolidated his power not only through equalizing (Gleichschaltung) all relevant 
political, social and cultural aspects of German culture, but also through the elimination of 
potential political opponents, Hitler justified the suppression of the opposition as necessary to 
16 
 
  
protect the country. Understandably, Switzerland felt under siege and threatened both on a 
political level and a cultural one. In response to the specter of Nazi invasion, Swiss elites 
initiated a movement that became known as “geistige Landesverteidigung” (spiritual national 
defense). Its purpose was the protection of Switzerland through the strengthening of its 
unique national identity: 
The Geistige Landesverteidigung aimed to emphasize Swiss individuality and 
thereby strengthen the desire for political independence and military national 
defense. It thereby fulfilled a desire (and the necessity) to demarcate itself from 
the outside world, in particular from the Third Reich, and also promoted internal 
social stability.
22
   
Although not a new concept, the geistige Landesverteidigung was a direct reaction to the dire 
threat from the Third Reich, promoted by the country’s elites. The Landesverteidigung’s 
power and profound influence impacted the Swiss national character and lasted for much 
longer than the interwar period and World War II, as Joseph Mooser has explained: 
        This key phrase is associated with the experience and memory of the 
country’s critical situation in the period between the two world wars and, in 
particular, the collective experience of standing up to National Socialist German, 
which since 1933 had been perceived by a great majority of the population as a 
threat to their very existence. Thus the values, attitudes, and objectives of the 
Swiss self-image in the context of the ‘spiritual national defense’ […] exerted an 
influence that lasted until well after the Second World War.
23
 
The need for internal unity and the strengthening of the Swiss self-image were driving 
forces of the movement of the Geistige Landesverteidigung and triggered additional cultural 
as well as political measures. From a cultural aspect, the Swiss National Exhibition of 1939 
under the title “Landigeist” (spirit of the home country) is a telling example of the national 
cultural atmosphere at this time. Politically, the Bundesversammlung (Federal Convention) of 
Switzerland is made up by the Nationalrat (National Assembly) and the Ständerat (Council 
                                                 
22
 Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland, National Socialism and 
the Second World War (Zürich: Pendo Verlag, 2002), 74 [hereinafter cited as ICE].. 
23
 Joseph Mooser, “Spiritual National Defense,” in Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 236-237. 
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of States). The Bundesversammlung granted the Bundesrat (National Council) in August 
1939 – as part of the Geistige Landesverteidigung -- and in order to allow the Swiss 
government to react quickly and effectively to the developments of the war – full emergency 
powers and authorized it to enact laws without a statutory basis. On the grounds of protecting 
the country, the Bundesrat made use of these powers. During the war it heavily censored the 
press, radio, film, photography and books; it also put various restrictions on the public 
discourses of the nation’s newspapers. 
The Swiss nation experienced exhilarating relief when the war had come to an end in 
Europe in May 1945. The axis powers had collapsed and Switzerland had survived this “age 
of catastrophe” (Hobsbawm). Switzerland did not get swallowed up by the gigantic clash of 
world powers. Yet the challenge for a small nation to survive in the midst of a new conflict 
emerging between the former allies in East and West posed new threats and challenges. 
Before World War II Swiss neutrality was regarded as a virtue. During and after the war, 
however, it aroused suspicions not only from the hostile axis powers (Hitler referred to 
Switzerland as “a pimple on the face of Europe”24), but also amongst the friendly allies. As 
early as in 1942, a British journalist described Switzerland as the place “where the big shot 
Nazis have parked their loot.”25 This raised the issue of secret Swiss collaboration with 
Hitler’s Germany. The possibility, then, of being implicated with being an accessory in the 
Nazi war of aggression and extermination emerged as a new threat by the end of the war. It is 
therefore not entirely surprising that the Swiss Bundesrat thought it unwise to abandon the 
powers granted by the Nationalversammlung during the war.  
In the shifting international environment and with the looming threat of wartime 
collaboration with the Nazis being exposed, Switzerland still needed to look out for its 
interests after the war.  It was this pragmatic mindset that heavily influenced the formation of 
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the Swiss collective memory of World War II in the following years.
26
 Since the future 
international standing of the country depended heavily on how its role during World War II 
was perceived by the victorious Allies, the politics of history in the construction of an 
acceptable historical memory of the war became  a prime national concern. Geistige 
Landesverteidigung not only allowed a more authoritative government coming out of the war 
to influence the collective memory. It also resulted in what Mooser calls an “identity 
construct.”27 Both these developments significantly shaped the way the Second World War 
was remembered by the Swiss.   
3.2. Mythmaking à la Suisse: The Construction of the Official Post-war 
Collective Memory 
The construction of Swiss official historical memory of World War II began 
immediately after the end of the war in the tradition of the Geistige Landesverteidigung 
exercised before and during World War II. It was a defensive act against external pressure 
and it aimed at protecting national unity, identity, and self-image.  There was an immediate 
need to include the events of the war as a coherent part of Swiss identity in a pragmatically 
refurbished national historical narrative. At the center of this construction were both the 
reinforcement of old and the establishment of new national historical myths, above all the 
myth of the Réduit Alpine (the successful retreat into the core fortress of the Swiss defense 
system in case of an attack), and the myth of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan during 
World War II, welcoming refugees from Nazi Germany. The “concretion” (Assmann) of 
these myths was so powerful and profound that it took journalists, artists, historians and – 
eventually – the Swiss government decades to demystify and deconstruct the trajectory of 
World War II to make a way for a more rational and factual examination of Switzerland’s 
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role during the war. In the late 1940s the international political arena was still so acutely 
unstable in the eyes of the country’s leadership that close Swiss cooperation with both Nazis 
and allies needed to be silenced in order to maintain the myth of strict Swiss neutrality during 
the war. The country needed its rootedness in its identity of neutrality and unity of purpose. 
Thus the myths of relentless military defense of Swiss independence and acting as a safe 
haven for refugees from Nazi Germany were a vital part of this process of stabilization. This 
stabilization effort is reflected by the important role the government and the army assumed as 
the designers and guardians of the collective memory of World War II. Swiss statesmen such 
as Max Petitpierre and military leaders such as General Guisan assumed the role of principal 
mythmakers. 
3.2.1. National Myths and the Creation of Official Lieux de Mémoire 
The construction and conservation of historical myths has been an important part in 
Swiss statesmanship and historiography. According to Markus Furrer, myths are an important 
part of Switzerland’s representation of the past since Switzerland’s identity is in the first 
place a historic construction. The national identity of the multi-ethnic country Switzerland is 
not based on ethnic principles like in the case of Germany, or cultural traits like in the case of 
France.
28
 Therefore, historical myths have been vital in the creation of a coherent Swiss 
nation; they have played an important part in establishing a Swiss national identity, and have 
provided the Swiss national historical narrative with continuity from the Middle Ages to the 
20
th
 century.
29
 With these historical myths playing such an important role in defining Swiss 
national identity, it was important to align the events of the Second World War with this 
carefully constructed Swiss historical narrative.  
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 Among the most dominant myths in the post-World-War-II era of Switzerland role 
during World War II were the myths of Swiss neutrality during the war, the Réduit Alpine, 
and Switzerland as the Good Samaritan.
30
 These myths were used as powerful guideposts 
around which the collective memory of the war in post-war Switzerland was organized. 
Events that fit the mythical self-image were emphasized, reinforced and often embellished. 
Historical facts such as Switzerland rejection of some 20,000 refugees denied entry at the 
borders (“Das Boot ist voll”), both Swiss cooperation with Nazi Germany (in the economic 
arena) and the Allies (allowing intelligence operatives and activities on its soil), which did 
not fit the official concept of the pursuit of strict neutrality during the war, were temporarily 
forgotten and silenced in the historical narrative and only came to light decades after World 
War II.
31
 The establishment and cultivation of these historical myths is particularly evident 
when examining the way Swiss history books presented the events of World War II in the 
post-war period.  
 Switzerland’s strict wartime neutrality was a powerful, yet dangerous myth in post-
war Switzerland. Powerful, since it became an important and lasting lieu de mémoire for 
Switzerland and part of the Swiss self-image, but also dangerous in the sense that it formed a 
smokescreen for secret activities during World War II that were not intended to be made 
public to the Swiss people.  Swiss collaboration with Axis and Allied powers needed to be 
suppressed or communicated carefully.  After all, Switzerland was not invaded but rather 
dealt with those powers discreetly behind the scenes. Switzerland refused to join the 
collective security arrangements of the United Nations in 1945/46, again hiding behind the 
smokescreen of strict neutrality. Therefore, Swiss Bundesrat Max Petitpierre, Switzerland’s 
iconic foreign minister between 1945 and 1961 and former law professor at the university of 
                                                 
30
 Furrer, Nation im Schulbuch. 
31
 ICE, 118. 
21 
 
  
Neuenburg, added the concept of international solidarity to Switzerland’s neutrality policy.32 
“Neutrality and Solidarity” was the heading under which the Swiss role in World War II was 
to be remembered, a concept that was supposed to describe the past as well as serve the 
present and the future. By adding the concept of solidarity to Switzerland’s neutrality, 
Switzerland positioned itself on the “good” side of the war while still adhering to its 
neutrality, but not just merely sitting on the fence, but actively supporting the victims of the 
conflict. Markus Furrer explained how Switzerland was viewed to have been saved during the 
war by its putative policy of strict neutrality and fierce national independence as well as its 
role as the Good Samaritan: 
Die mythologisierte Darstellung von Neutralität verknüpft Unabhängigkeit und 
Neutralität aufs Engste, sie erkennt in der Neutralität die Ursache für das 
Verschontbleiben der Schweiz vor den Katastrophen des kurzen 20. Jahrhunderts 
und verknüpft damit den Wohltätigkeitsgedanken einer helfenden Schweiz.
33
 
Just how far the Swiss government was willing to go to protect this myth of strict 
neutrality becomes clear in the controversy about the publication of the important multi-
volume collection of captured German documents in Documents on German Foreign Policy 
by the American government. The Swiss government worked tirelessly for almost a decade to 
stop the publication of documents that revealed evidence of a secret Franco-Swiss military 
cooperation during the war, which would have undermined its concept of strict neutrality. 
Although the documents were published in 1961, the government succeeded in averting a 
crisis with these historical revelations. It successfully ‘distracted’ the Swiss people by 
focussing on a document that described Corps Commander Ulrich Wille’s contact with the 
German ambassador in Switzerland.  The people´s attention was focused on Wille´s 
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sympathetic attitude towards the Germans and the publication of the Documents on German 
Foreign Policy took a back seat. 
As a last resort, therefore, and in the nick of time, Wille became the sacrifice that 
would prevent the feared questioning of neutrality as a result of the uproar over 
another scandal. But the foundations of the neutrality myth were shaken anyway, 
although the ‘affair of the deputy’ successfully prevented the full dimensions of 
this becoming apparent to the Swiss public.
34
 
Looking at how the Swiss neutrality myth was portrayed in Swiss history books in the post-
war period further illustrates the mythical character of the neutrality concept. Markus Furrer’s 
detailed analysis is invaluable for this task. His research demonstrates how, up until the late 
1980s, the concept of Swiss neutrality was mostly offered as a plausible description of and 
key element in Switzerland’s historical narrative in Swiss schoolbooks, and how a few 
textbooks even presented the myth as a seemingly unquestionable historical fact (e.g. a 
textbook by Eugen Halter from 1960/61).
35
 
 The myth of the Réduit Alpine/National combines a conceptual lieu de mémoire, 
remembering the military threat and the steadfastness of the Swiss people and the army, with 
an actual, geographical one: the Alps. The Alps form the heart of the Réduit national, which 
can be translated as National Retreat/Space, and serve as a symbol for Switzerland’s military 
resistance against Nazi Germany throughout the war. In dozens of post-war Swiss history text 
books, the myth of the Réduit national dominates the chapter on World War II in 
Switzerland. The military aspects and the threat against the Swiss people are at the center of 
attention. It seems like it was only due to brave General Guisan and the courage and 
willingness of the Swiss army to resist a potential Nazi invasion that Switzerland was not 
overrun by the Axis powers. The containment of the Nazi threat succeeded due to the 
deterrent effect of the sturdy Swiss army. The following excerpt of a history book from 1975 
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illustrates the fearsome nature of the Swiss Alpine fortress, where every nook and cranny 
became a gun emplacement, clearly: 
Im Herzen der Schweiz, wo ihre Freiheit gegründet worden war, sollte sie im 
Falle eine[s] Angriffs verteidigt werden. Das ganze Bergland wurde zu einer 
mächtigen Festung ausgebaut. Aus unzulänglichen Felsennestern richteten 
Geschütze ihre Mündungen nach allen Tälern.
36
  
Especially in the light of the new nuclear threats of the Cold War, the myth of the 
Réduit National served the important purpose of strengthening Swiss national morale. It built 
confidence to defy any enemy through their power of will and readiness to die for their 
country once again. The fact that Switzerland in fact was not invaded during the war and the 
perception of General Guisan as the key figure in protecting and leading the defence of 
Switzerland, put him and the army in a powerful position to shape and define the memory of 
World War II. This is illustrated by the largely militarized memory of World War II as 
portrayed in Furrer’s analysis of Swiss history books after the war. It was not until the 1990s 
that most textbooks presented the myth of the Réduit Alpine as an actual myth and not as a 
historical fact. However, in a long special historical edition, published in 1990 with the title 
“Switzerland and the Second World War,” 21 of a total of 80 pages were dedicated to the 
military readiness of the country.
37
 
 The third national myth established as a pillar of the collective memory of World War 
II in Switzerland was the fiction of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan. Initiated by Max 
Petitpierre’s addition of the concept of solidarity as a constituent element of strict Swiss 
neutrality, it remembered Switzerland as the originator of the international Red Cross and as 
a humanitarian and benevolent country. During the World War II the notion of the Good 
Samaritan Switzerland was illustrated perfectly by its supposedly having voluntarily opened 
its doors to political and racial refugees, having acted through the Red Cross as the main third 
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party protector of prisoners of war, and having made an effort to “assuage the evils of the 
war.”38 
A demonstration of the importance of this memory is the result of the so-called 
“White Paper affair” in Switzerland in 1946 (see 3.2.2). Originally intended as a report on the 
government’s activities during the war, the project was transformed into “a collection of 
essays on Switzerland’s humanitarian activities during the war. […] This transformation, 
then, is clearly illustrative of a policy which Peter Hug has described as compensation for 
‘Switzerland’s failure to participate in the construction of post-war peace by means of 
nationally exaggerated humanitarian activities’.”39  
Once it became known, that Switzerland had marked the passport of German and 
Austrian Jews with a “J”-stamp, the Swiss government commissioned Dr. Carl Ludwig, a law 
professor from Basle and a former government councilor with the production on a report on 
Swiss refugee policy. Now known as the Ludwig Report, it came out in 1957 and its author 
did not mince words: 
Ludwig was determined to expose the restrictive attitude of the authorities 
unsparingly; he deplored the fact that refugee policy was largely determined by 
the aliens section of the police … he also referred to the restrictive requirements 
of the army and the ‘not very creditable attitude’ of certain cantons. He had no 
time for the excuse that people had too little knowledge of what was going on 
over there in the Reich’.40 
The Swiss government employed various strategies to justify its refugee policy and did not 
shy away from using an individual as a scapegoat in order to protect its image. In an 
important section on the introduction of the “J”-stamp, the report stated that, according to Dr. 
Oprecht, a national councilor, Dr. Rothmund, the Chief of Police during World War II had 
initiated the use of the “J”-stamp in 1938 and was therefore to be solely responsible for its 
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consequences. In fact, however, the Swiss Federal Council had made all the significant 
decisions in relation to the introduction of the “J”-stamp itself, as it admitted many years 
later.
,41
  
Although the 1957 Ludwig report contained some harsh criticism of the way the 
refugee policy had been handled during the war, it did not trigger a memory debate or any 
self-criticism.
42
 The press played a considerable role in maintaining the myth of Switzerland 
as a Good Samaritan: The liberal Neue Zürcher Zeitung for example, stated that “the lessons 
lay not in the excessively restrictive attitude, but more in the fact, that the inherently correct 
principle of ‘generous acceptance’ had to be kept within limits because of food problems and 
security requirements.”43 Equally, the socialist newspaper Volksrecht warned against the 
complacency of hindsight and pointed out that the “significantly more comfortable standpoint 
of 1957”44 should not be abused to criticize decisions that were made under very difficult and 
complex circumstances. 
When looking at Swiss history books, it becomes evident that the country’s behaviour 
as a merciful and generous benefactor to refugees was rarely questioned until the 1980s. Only 
40 years after the war was it possible to question Switzerland’s “Good Samaritan” image 
during World War II and the closing of its borders to floods of refugees from Hitler’s 
Germany (“das Boot ist voll”).45 
3.2.2. The Politics of History: The Role of the Swiss Government 
The Swiss government ruled the country during the World War II with a considerable amount 
of authoritative power that was democratically legitimated. By the end of the war the 
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politicians had become used to the idea that, in order to protect the country and its population, 
excessive authority had to be used and tough decisions had to be made. This mindset was also 
applied to the way the Swiss remembered their own past: 
Die Landesregierung verstand sich als Hüterin eines Geschichtsbildes, das nach 
wie vor der Staatsraison zu dienen hatte. Dieser Zweck schien unzimperliche 
Massnahmen zu rechtfertigen.
46
 
Already during the first post-war month the concretion of historical memory of the war was 
put in place. Halbwachs’ theory that the past is a construction based on the concerns of the 
present was quickly becoming apparent when we look at the specific actions of the Swiss 
government in defining the framework of an acceptable historical narrative of Swiss behavior 
during the war. Understandably, its pragmatic principal concern was for Switzerland to 
survive World War II with all its aftershocks and every decision was subordinated to this 
national goal. In this framework, the memory of the war was a powerful tool that could be 
used to fortify Swiss identity and its status in the world, but it also needed to be controlled. 
This becomes clear when looking at an incident that happened in 1945 concerning the 
documentary evidence to buttress the factual history of World War II. Two members of the 
Nationalrat, Albert Maag and Urs Dietschi, requested that documentary evidence be made 
available to back up the government’s official reports on anti-democratic activities during the 
Second World War.
47
 From the very outset of constructing an official collective memory, 
official reports and white papers were a popular form for the government to communicate the 
official, yet seemingly objective, historical narrative of Swiss actions during World War II. 
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The “controlled management of the past” was crucial to contain the “hidden dangers of 
explosive revelation” that might have demystified the official narrative.48 
The Swiss government commissioned the historian Werner Näf, a history professor at 
the university of Bern, to file a report and to provide the Swiss government with options on 
how to deal with Mag’s and Dietschi’s potentially explosive request. Näf presented the 
government with three options to control access to the World War II past: “1. Publication of 
the Swiss political documents, in other words a “White Paper”; 2. A documented account of 
Swiss foreign policy during wartime by a historian commissioned by the Federal Council; 3. 
A future free academic use of the material.”49 After careful deliberation, Näf proposed to 
reject both the first and the third options. The publication of a White Paper, he argued, would 
not be in line with the way the Swiss government had pursued its policy in the past; 
publishing a purged record would give the impression that the Swiss had something to hide.
50
 
He rejected the third option for different reasons. If the material was made available 
completely to the public and academic study raised issues of timing and academic integrity: 
“’whether they would be dealt with in a true academic sense … would be a matter of chance 
and hardly likely in the immediate future’, which would not be in line with the intended 
purpose of an ‘early public elucidation of Swiss foreign policy’.”51 Based on this reasoning, 
Näf recommended to the Swiss government to go with the second option and commission a 
historian to write a well-documented account. The government then could control the 
outcome by commissioning a carefully selected reliable historian. This line of argument was 
classic politics of history – you control the outcome by narrowing access to the record to a 
select historian who understands what is at stake for his nation’s reputation in the world. 
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Näf’s argumentation, then, sheds light on the mindset of the Swiss leadership and 
political elite in the immediate post-war period regarding the construction of the memory of 
the war. It clearly demonstrates how eminently political the definition of wartime Swiss 
memory was. First, Swiss historical memory had to be presented to the public in a form that 
was acceptable for the government’s image at home and abroad. The government kept strict 
control over the formation of the nation’s wartime memory. Enough information had to be 
made available to remain credible but not too much to spill the beans on Swiss complicity. 
Second, the government decided what could be publicized and what not – historians such as 
Näf only played a subordinate role in this process. Third, memory must not be allowed to 
form loosely and freely since it had to “enlighten” the Swiss population as to the 
government’s benevolent role during the war and topresent the government in a favorable 
light. 
Regarding the theory of memory we can observe several aspects of Halbwachs’, Nora’s 
and Assmann’s concepts in the way the Swiss government dealt with the past. First, the past 
was already shaped by the immediate concerns of the present. Switzerland needed to be 
protected from the weight of the complicit past and reassured about its future, and the 
government’s politics of history on how to deal with the World War II trajectory of its history 
reflected this urgent need. Secondly, we can observe what Nora called the “acceleration of 
history” (as described in more detail in chapter 2.2) through the government. This speeding 
up of the institutionalizing and fixation of historical memory, which then became history, was 
at best an (incomplete) representation of the past. Third, we can see the memory already in its 
actuality, as Assmann described it, and no longer in its organic bits and pieces, the usual 
incoherent factual chaos that is the historical past. The government took on the task of 
selecting the “official” and “relevant” pieces of information from the infinite pool of 
historical matter and shaped it into a usable past on behalf of the entire population, never 
29 
 
  
mind that individual memories often clashed with the official collective memory. This clash 
too had to be silenced. The further development of Näf’s suggestion to commission a 
historian to write a coherent master narrative of Switzerland’s role during the war further 
supports this point. Ultimately the government implemented none of his three suggested 
options (White Paper, documentation, academic analysis).  Instead, the government pursued a 
minimal version, to highlight Switzerland’s role as Good Samaritan and squeaky clean 
neutral power 
All that was now being attempted was a collection of essays on Switzerland’s 
humanitarian activities during the war. This transformation of the White Paper is 
all the more astonishing in that the original plan for a collection of documents had 
in no way been conceived as a critical reworking of the past but, rather, as an 
apologetic presentation of the way neutrality had been handled under Axis 
pressure.
52
 
The “critical reworking of the past” in order to master it, was not Switzerland’s highest 
priority in the immediate post-war period. There were more critical demands of national and 
international politics that were more pressing and needed to be addressed pragmatically. The 
construction of a historical memory of the war served as a powerful tool in the government’s 
hands to fashion a usable and masterable past. However, the government cannot take all the 
credit for the success and acceptance of its official concretion of historical memory of World 
War II:  
Because of personal experience and the ‘conditioning’ of minds during the time 
of conflict, the Swiss population shared a very positive image of the part their 
country had played during the war. It was, therefore, entirely ready to accept the 
reassuring image offered to it by its leaders.
53
 
In other words, the Swiss people were complicit too in settling with the simplistic version of 
a usable past: they heard what they wanted to hear. For the most part they eagerly embraced 
the government’s official version of the historical memory of World War II. 
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3.2.3. The Hedgehog: General Guisan and the Swiss Army 
The Swiss government was undoubtedly the main player in the construction of an 
acceptable collective and cultural memory of the war, albeit not the only one. In the 
immediate post-war years in Switzerland, the army had a noteworthy influence on national 
affairs in Switzerland. The Army chief spokesman was General Guisan who emerged as one 
of Switzerland’s most respected leaders out of World War II. As the commander-in-chief of 
the Swiss army, General Guisan’s opinion was highly respected and influential. He emerged 
at the center in the creation of an idealized and heroic public version of Swiss historical 
memory of World War II. The subsequent powerful “sanctification” of World War II memory 
through his speeches and public statements created a certain sense of obligation to bring 
personal individual memories in line with Guisan’s version of the collective memory. In his 
view there was   only one way of remembering World War II and the accomplishments of 
what he called “the generation of 1939 to 1945.” Switzerland’s survival through difficult 
times deserved to be honored. The following statement in his order of the day for 8 May 1945 
illustrates his version of a usable past, never mind that the Swiss army did not fire a single 
shot in the war: 
What is important, then, is that the benefit of this experience, this trial, should not 
be wasted. If, in the near or more distant future, our army were to be called to 
arms to defend our independence once again, the generation of 1939 to 1945 will 
arise again, identify themselves and join the ranks. But those men will only be 
worthy of their task if they do not reject it in any way either in their deeds or in 
their thoughts, and if they pass on to those who follow their courage, their sense 
of duty and their loyalty.
54
 
This excerpt gives an impression of the mechanisms that were involved in the establishment 
of a collective memory immediately after the war and the role the army’s leadership played in 
it. First, it established the army as the main player in the defense of Switzerland’s 
independence and therefore the savior of Switzerland. Second, it reinforced the thinking that 
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there was only one “right” way to interpret and remember the war. Everybody who would 
“reject their task in any way, either in their deeds or in their thoughts” would not be worthy 
of fighting for Switzerland. Guisan almost demanded “blind” obedience to his narrative of the 
war from the Swiss people. Merely questioning the official narrative was unworthy of a 
Swiss citizen and smacked of a traitor. Guisan’s narrative created a version of official 
historical memory that was, irreversibly set in stone only months after the end of the war (e.g. 
Assmann’s “concretion” of memory).  
Another core document that helped establish the trajectory of Swiss historical memory 
of the war as one shaped by the military, was General Guisan’s report to the Bundesrat about 
the army’s activities during the war. Ostensibly, it was a plain documentation of Swiss 
military preparedness during the war. In fact, the report significantly shaped Swiss historical 
memory of the war by initiating the public debate on the events between 1939 and 1945. As a 
primarily military document, it has three main consequences:  
First, it is a ‘memorial’ to the spirit of resistance in the Swiss people and their 
army; second, it helps to ‘militarize’ the memory of the war; and third, it 
strengthens the image of a hedgehog Switzerland, owing its fate to its courage 
alone…55 
In this initial post-war period, Switzerland’s memory of World War II became firmly fixed, 
as Pierre Béguin has noted,
56
 and the themes and myths established during this time would 
prove to be enduring. They dominated Swiss historical memory discourses for at least two 
generations after the war. It was almost impossible to question this version of the usable past 
set into stone by the wartime generation.  
 
                                                 
55
 Van Dongen, 270. 
56
 Pierre Béguin, 277. 
32 
 
  
4. The “Helvetic Malaise” with History 
The mystified Swiss perception of its own history was so deeply rooted that not even major 
events that triggered an international debate on memory and the war could affect it. In the 
early 1960s, for example, the high profile Auschwitz and Eichmann trials could not shake 
Switzerland’s view of its own past. Like in Austria, the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, although 
well covered, sparked not enough interest to realistically challenge the cultivated memory 
dogmas established immediately after the war.
57
 However, individual memories of the war 
were not lost entirely. From the 1950s onwards, an increasing number of intellectuals, 
writers, and artists found creative ways of dealing with their own view of the past and 
challenging the Swiss government and its official memory policy. They were soon followed 
by a growing number of historians, such as Georg Kreis or Marc Perrenoud, who gradually 
“undermined the self-congratulatory myths about Switzerland’s conduct towards Nazi 
Germany.”58 The Swiss government, however, seemed to by limping behind these 
developments, and held onto the attempt to regulate and contain history by commissioning 
official reports: In 1962 the Bundesrat instructed the historian Edgar Bonjour to write a report 
on Switzerland’s foreign policy during World War II, a request entirely in the tradition of 
Näf’s White Paper in 1945. 
4.1.  The Establishment of a Beachhead: Artists and Intellectuals Begin to 
Question Official Memory  
In her essay “What is so special about Switzerland” Regula Ludi talks about an “engendered 
uneasiness” among Swiss thinkers and creative minds, starting as early as the 1950s. In its 
beginnings, however, these alternative views of the past were only expressed periodically and 
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did not resonate with the Swiss public.
59
 It was only from the 1970s onwards, however, that 
artists and intellectuals successfully managed to challenge the constructed memory of 
Switzerland’s mythological World War II past. It took a new generation of historians and 
intellectuals, often born after the war, to question the outdated official old verities and draw 
up an emerging new version of Switzerland’s complex history during World War II. 
An example for the expression of this growing “malaise”60 is the work of Swiss writer 
Max Frisch. Born in Zurich in 1911 as the son of an architect, Frisch published countless 
articles, essays and dozens of novels, and is widely regarded as one of the most influential 
Swiss writers of the 20
th
 century. In his novels as well as in his diaries and his work as a 
publicist, he picked Switzerland and its past and identity as a central theme, and confronted 
the official memory constructs.  
Particularly relevant with regard to Switzerland’s historical memory of World War II is 
his work Dienstbüchlein, published in 1974.
61
 It was effectively a revision of his personal 
early wartime diary, Blätter aus dem Brotsack 
62
 that had been published in 1940/39. Frisch 
not only reflected critically upon his personal perspective during World War II and the army 
in general, but also expressed his consternation about Switzerland’s cooperation with Nazi 
Germany. The reactions to Frisch’s Dienstbüchlein were controversial. Frisch was already an 
established and respected author, so the fundamental question was whether his book had, 
besides its literary value, also a historical significance. If the book proved to communicate 
some historical truth, it would radically challenge the myth of Switzerland as a well-fortified 
“hedgehog,” surviving the war because of its army and its neutrality. Although some critics, 
such as noted historians Jean Rudolf von Salis or Hermann Burger conceded some historical 
value to the book, others like Zurich linguist Ernst Leisi, interestingly accused Frisch of 
                                                 
59
 Ludi, 225. 
60
 Ludi, 225 
61
 The Dienstbüchlein was the Swiss identification card used during military service. 
62
 Translated “pages out of my lunch bag (literally bread bag). 
34 
 
  
describing a myth, not history.
63
 Leisi tried to reinforce the well-established and comfortable 
official version of the past that had been established immediately after the war. 
One of the most significant artistic representations of Switzerland’s process of 
beginning to come to terms with its past is the film Das Boot ist voll.
64
 The production by 
Markus Imhoof is based on a book by novelist Alfred Häsler of the same title. The film was 
screenend in 1981 and expressed the “malaise”65 with the current historical memory of World 
War II by telling the fictional story of six people who sought refuge in Switzerland in 1942. 
These were the Jewish siblings Judith and Olaf, Ostrowskij, an old Jewish man from Vienna 
with his granddaughter, a French orphan and a German deserter. They were all seeking 
asylum in the neutral country that had officially closed its borders to all “refugees who have 
fled purely on racial grounds.”66 The film does not sugar-coat anything. In the end, Judith, 
Olaf, Ostrowskij and his granddaughter – the refugees that had fled to Switzerland on racial 
grounds – were escorted to the border by the authorities, where certain death awaited them in 
the concentration camp of Treblinka. 
In a dramatic way, the story shed light on a dark aspect of Switzerland’s past that had 
been swept under the carpet for four decades and directly challenged the foundation myth of 
Switzerland’s World War II role as the Good Samaritan. Predictably, the reactions to 
Imhoof’s film project were mixed. Already before the actual production of the film, the Swiss 
government criticized Imhoof. He had applied for a grant to cover parts of the production 
costs of the project, but he was turned down by the Bundesrat with the argument that it was 
antiquated in its dramatic approach – cheap popular theater: 
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Dem Projekt fehlt die historische Distanz und Würdigung. Es wirkt 
dramaturgisch veraltet und erinnert in negativem Sinne an Volkstheater. Ein 
Beitrag wird einstimmig abgelehnt.
67
 
However, the film made ends meet with funding made available by Swiss, Austrian, and 
West German television stations. The finished product was screened in 1981.
68
 While the 
Swiss media purported to be unmoved, especially the international press was very impressed 
with the efforts of the Swiss filmmaker. While the Swiss newspaper Der Tages-Anzeiger 
referred to the film as “definitely one of Markus Imhoof’s weaker films,” The New York 
Times was full of praise for the production: “’The Boat is full’ is something more than a 
discovery, something in the neighborhood of a revelation.”69 Das Boot ist voll received five 
awards at the Berlin Film Festival in 1981.
70
 Was the ice of Switzerland’s frozen World War 
II past finally broken? 
4.2. Containing a Break in the Dam: The Bonjour Report 
While artists and intellectuals had gradually been deconstructing postwar official Swiss 
memory and helped construct a more diverse and unvarnished memory of World War II, the 
government stubbornly still held on to its antiquarian politics of history and traditional 
strategy of commissioning reports to control official public memory culture. In 1962, the 
Swiss government commissioned the respected historian Edgar Bonjour to prepare a report 
on Switzerland’s foreign policy during World War II. Once again external circumstances 
triggered the commissioning of the Bonjour Report, like the White Paper of 1945, and the 
Ludwig Report on refugees of 1957. The massive collection of Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, published in 1961, and an article by the British journalist Jon Kimche 
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portrayed Switzerland and the Swiss government in a completely new light than the Swiss 
government had practiced for so long. These documents revealed Swiss political and 
economic cooperation with Nazi Germany on many fronts. Under this external pressure, the 
government agreed to let an established and deemed trustworthy historian access the Federal 
documents.
71
 However, the Swiss government reserved the right to censor Bonjour’s 
publications, and “’deleted at least one third of the original manuscript, in many cases highly 
informative documents’ from his first documentary supplement, as he [Bonjour] himself 
bitterly stated in his foreword [of the published report].”72 Only when the Swiss press and 
Swiss historians heavily criticized the government did it agree to allow Bonjour to make 
many of the censored documents public. However, once again the finished and tamed work 
with the title The History of Swiss Neutrality ultimately failed to initiate an open debate on 
neutrality. Georg Kreis explains: 
Presentation of Swiss foreign relations was directed so much towards the 
traditional understanding of neutrality that the new discoveries fit harmoniously 
into the old pattern of knowledge. Whether the Federal Council which 
commissioned the work strived for this consciously or unconsciously, all in all 
the report supplied a confirmation of the old through the new.
73
 
Swiss historian Jakob Tanner agreed with this perspective in an article for the NZZ Folio in 
1991. Tanner argued that Bonjour painted in his History of Swiss Neutrality a picture of 
“striking continuity” of the Swiss state system. He criticized that Bonjour’s fundamental faith 
in this continuity was neither rational nor argumentative.
74
  
The Bonjour Report ultimately failed to challenge the Swiss myth of neutrality during 
the war, and promoted the initiation of a more unbiased discussion of Switzerland’s role and 
identity. Yet the heating up of this debate was left to a new generation of historians. 
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4.3. Deconstructing the Historical Myths: Critical Scholarly Research and A 
New Generation of Historians 
Unleashed by artists and intellectuals in the 1960s, a new generation of historians picked up 
the discussion of Switzerland’s role during World War II in the 1970s and 80s. Younger 
historians increasingly deconstructed the official historical memory of the war, and created a 
widening gap between official memory myths and critical scholarly empirical research.
75
 By 
the end of the 1980s, Swiss historians had basically dismantled the main myths that made up 
official Swiss historical and cultural memory of World War II.  
 The myth of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan was challenged by research on 
Switzerland’s policy on refugees from Nazi Germany. Important studies on the subject were 
produced already before the 1970s and 80s, such as the official Ludwig report on refugees of 
1957. However, up until the 1970s the revelations dealing with Switzerland’s refugee 
politics, mostly failed in provoking a real debate on the issue.
76
 Although facts like the 
rejection of over 20,000 Jewish refugees at the Swiss borders were available to the Swiss 
public, it did not significantly register with the public and alter Switzerland’s self-perception 
as a Good Samaritan. Only projects like the 1978 TV-miniseries Holocaust, or the film Das 
Boot ist voll in 1981 created a more receptive climate for publications on Swiss refugee 
politics, such as Hans-Ulrich Jost’s Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer or Jacques 
Picard’s Die Schweiz und die Juden.77 These books no longer minced words: “Jost said of the 
refugee policy that it had been ‘extremely restrictive’ in the 1930s, had been ‘tightened in an 
inhumane manner’ after the outbreak of war and formed the darkest chapter of the country’s 
history during the Second World War.”78 The combination of unvarnished creative 
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representations and critical academic publications, coupled with the support of a broad echo 
in the national media, created a more accurate image of Switzerland’s refugee politics during 
World War II: “These recollective efforts even resulted, in 1992, in the minting of an official 
commemorative coin bearing an uncompromising image of barbed wire and a portrait of the 
wartime refugee activist Gertrud Kurz.”79  
 The myth of Switzerland as a relentlessly neutral country during the war was 
unmasked by studies revealing the significance of the economic relationships between 
Switzerland and the Third Reich. Works by Klaus Urner and Edgar Bonjour established how 
external pressure forced Switzerland to abandon its neutral position. Towards the end of the 
1980s, Werner Rings, Peter Utz and Hans Ulrich Jost discovered that Switzerland had 
purchased enormous amounts of gold from Nazi Germany.
80
 In his work Bedrohung und 
Enge, 
Jost placed the centre of gravity in his discussion on the Swiss financial center’s 
cooperation with Germany and gave a comprehensive analysis of the role of 
‘Switzerland as a central entrepôt for movements of gold and foreign exchange’, 
singling out the ‘morally disquieting’ acceptance of looted gold and the granting 
of a clearing loan to Germany.”81 
Revelations like these, based on careful archival work by scholars, shed an entirely new light 
on Switzerland’s role during the war, and shifted the country’s image from an innocent 
bystander to a greedy war profiteer. Switzerland made indeed some “Faustian bargains.”82  
 “This tended to play down the image of a Switzerland innocent because of its neutrality.”83  
One of the most important documents that questioned the Swiss myth of neutrality 
was Markus Heiniger’s work Dreizehn Gründe: Warum die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
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nicht erobert wurde,
84
 published in 1989.
85
 By analyzing non-military, but economic aspects 
of the question why Switzerland had been spared during the war, he undermined not only the 
myth of Swiss neutrality, but also of the power of the Swiss army. He even went as far as to 
say, that only a “systematic financial blockade and massive pressure by the Allies compelled 
the Swiss authorities at the war’s end, to curb the hitherto almost boundless freedom enjoyed 
by the banks.”86  
 As the brutally pragmatic economic pressures on and concessions made by 
Switzerland to make it through the war became gradually known, the myth of the Swiss 
réduit national, the alpine fortress in which the army defended Switzerland against the Third 
Reich, also came under intense scrutiny. Already in 1970, the journalist Christoph Geiser had 
mentioned that “Hitler didn’t have to occupy Switzerland, because Swiss industry worked for 
him anyway.”87 Over the course of the 1980s this view became more and more confirmed by 
scholars. Had Hitler decided to invade Switzerland, the Axis would have crushed the Swiss 
army in its alpine fortress. Hans-Ulrich Jost mentioned in 1983 that the occupation of 
Switzerland would have been costly, but by all means feasible without great difficulties.
88
 
The dismantlement of the power of the Swiss army was accompanied and further reinforced 
by an initiative of the radical left to abolish the army, namely to “slaughter the holy cow.”89 
Although the initiative did not succeed in the end, it still significantly weakened the position 
of the army as the unassailable “hedgehog” in the Alps as a principal lieux de mémoire of 
Swiss national historical memory.
90
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4.4. End of the Cold War: The Memory Crisis of 1989 
Although the referendum on the abolishment of the army failed in the end, only 35% of the 
voters had agreed to get rid of the army, a national symbol of the defense and protection of 
the country. The government took this vote as a reflection on the population’s confidence in 
its leadership. Yet all was not well: “For the government, the result was disastrous. It exposed 
both the failure of official memory politics and a loss of confidence in the ruling four-party 
coalition. The referendum’s coincidence with the fall of the Berlin Wall further deepened the 
crisis.”91 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made the crisis in 
Switzerland even worse. In a time of crisis, Switzerland normally would have drawn strength 
from its national historical myths to remind itself of its qualities and its identity as a strong, 
well-fortified, benevolent, and neutral country. But by the end of the 1980s, a considerable 
amount of critical research on Switzerland’s role during World War II had been  done, and 
most myths established in the post-war period had been dismantled by the intellectuals and 
historians. Although these findings had been widely ignored by politicians and the general 
public,
92
  they came to light when the government and the population needed them most. In a 
time of sea changes in the world order, the country fundamentally lacked orientation and a 
secure identity to fall back on – Switzerland no longer could rely on its dearly held World 
War II myths to hold on to in times of adversity.  
This widening discrepancy between academic research and official historical memory, 
combined with both the domestic and international political situation, triggered a major 
memory crisis in Switzerland in 1989. This initial confrontation with “unfinished business” 
from World War II should have been a wake-up call for Switzerland, and an opportunity to 
confront old memory dogmas and produce new collective memories by finally including the 
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research of a younger generation of historians and thus tempering and modifying the old 
historical myths.
93
 However, the crisis did not immediately initiate a paradigm shift. Once 
more, enormous pressure emanating from the outside was needed to make the Swiss 
government and the public at large adjust and alter their memory of World War II. Historian 
Elazar Barkan has analyzed this new “guilt of nations” in the 1990s as “new international 
moral frame” with an unprecedented “willingness of nations to embrace their own guilt.”94 
5. The Collapse of the Official World War II 
Mythology: The 1990s, the Commission of 
Independent Experts, and Mastering 
Switzerland’s World War II Past 
In the 1990s, almost 50 years after the end of World War II, history caught up with the Swiss 
people. The memory crisis of 1989 had failed to produce a new and honest collective 
accounting of the recent scholarly revisions clashing with the official historical memory. The 
Swiss public and the national and international media were greatly surprised, when a 
disgruntled Swiss bank clerk revealed to the world the existence of a large number of 
dormant secret bank accounts, many of them belonging to the victims of the Holocaust. 
American Jewish organizations filed a class-action lawsuit against Swiss banks, claiming 
back countless unclaimed assets dating back to World War II and pressuring Swiss banks to 
make public the identity of the holders of the the dormant bank accounts. Steps towards the 
return of these unclaimed assets had been made as far back as 1946 through the Washington 
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Accords and in 1962 through federal legislation, but they did not lead to satisfactory results:
95
 
“Although attempts to revisit this issue have been made ever since, we must acknowledge the 
frustration of Holocaust survivors and their heirs that this issue is still with us 50 years after 
the end of the War … Many have legitimately questioned why it has taken nearly 50 years to 
obtain a comprehensive and transparent accounting of this issue”,96 stated U.S. Under 
Secretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat before the House Banking and Financial Services 
Committee in Washington DC in 1996.
97
 The law suit ultimately resulted in a settlement 
between the Swiss banks and the Jewish organizations in 1998.
98
 Swiss banks now paid the 
prize for their lack of transparency when it came to Holocaust era assets parked in 
Switzerland during World War II. 
 The question what had happened to these unclaimed Jewish assets after the war was 
only the trigger for a much larger debate on Switzerland’s past. The claim for restitution by 
the Jewish organizations brought about a large amount of research, conducted in American 
and British archives.
99
  The question arose what Switzerland’s role during World War II 
actually looked like. If Switzerland had profited from the war, and managed to evade 
exposure on this matter, what else was hidden by the official collective memory established 
by the Swiss government? The research uncovered a lot of Switzerland’s unfinished business 
from World War II that had been deliberately silenced and suppressed by government and the 
business leadership in the immediate post-war era.  
In the 1990s, Switzerland was confronted with aspects of World War II the Swiss 
government had tried to brush under the carpet since the end of the war: Switzerland’s 
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collaboration with the Nazis, the purchase of Nazi gold by Swiss banks, Switzerland’s role as 
a hub for stolen art,
100
 and its cooperation with secret intelligence services were made public, 
as well as the refusal to admit Jewish refugees into the country: The monumental clash 
between the official memory production and scholarly research findings finally came to the 
fore:  
The discrepancy could not have been bigger in the mid-1990s between its 
officially endorsed image as the paragon of virtue—the cradle of the Red Cross 
and humanitarian law—and charges that painted the country as a Holocaust 
bystander ruthlessly profiteering from other people’s misery. In the eyes of 
observers from abroad, the Swiss appeared totally oblivious of their wartime 
past.
101
 
The process was extensively covered by the international media, and carried out in the 
spotlight of international attention. Switzerland had always cultivated its image as a 
benevolent and humanitarian nation, and the international press had a field day writing about 
this radical change of image: 
For a few years at the end of the twentieth century Switzerland was the focal 
point of a frenzy of activities, as diplomats, politicians, and lobbyists battled over 
one of the last pieces of ‘unfinished business from the Second World War … The 
inquest turned into a spectacle mediated by the global news media to a fascinated 
public around the world.
102
 
These international media attacks had serious repercussions for Switzerland. They damaged 
the country’s moral identity and challenged the population’s understanding of its 
government’s role in memory production and its own past. Scholarly research had been 
painting a different picture of Switzerland’s past – a view of the complex past that had been 
available since the 1980s – the large public and the government had failed to take note of the 
new scholarly findings and refused to include them in their individual memories --  their 
personal understanding of the past shaped by the comfortable Swiss collective memory. 
                                                 
100
 Jonathan Petropoulos, "Business as Usual: Switzerland, the Commerce in Artworks during and After World 
War II, and National Identity," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 7 (1998), 229-42. 
101
 Ludi, 214. 
102
 Cesarani, vii. 
44 
 
  
Therefore, the new image of the World War II past 1990 was a brutal wake-up call for the 
Swiss nation and produced a deep identity crisis. The Good Samaritan myth, the myth of the 
“hedgehog” Switzerland, and the myth of Switzerland’s neutrality all were unceremoniously 
shattered.  Jean-François Bergier described the climate in Switzerland as follows: 
The shadow has become so dense, that the Swiss can no longer find their own 
history within it, and have become disoriented. On this occasion the phenomenon 
really is exceptional, and it is being reflected in an unprecedented crisis of the 
Swiss conscience.
103
 
In 1996, this “crisis of conscience” became so serious that the Swiss government issued an 
urgent federal decree, calling for the creation of an independent commission of experts (ICE) 
to “study, from a historical and legal standpoint, the fate of assets which found their way to 
Switzerland after the national socialist regime came to power.”104 The Swiss government 
once again fell back on a well-established device in its politics of history – to establish a 
historian’s commission to produce a report that might clear the air. Given the international 
attention given to Switzerland’s unseemly role in World War II, this time it had to be an 
international historians’ commission. 
 In a sense, the establishment of the ICE was as surprising as it was expected. From 
Näf’s White Paper in 1945, to Ludwig’s Report in 1957, to the Bonjour Report 1962, the 
commissioning of reports had been the governments preferred method of dealing and 
controlling historical memory for decades. Considering the fact, however, that government’s 
repeated attempts to control and shape historical memory had caused the crisis of the 1990s 
in the first place, it is surprising that the Swiss government chose the same strategy in its 
politics of history to resolve the current crisis.  
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Yet this commission was different. For one it was an international commission of 
historians. The membership of the international commission read like a “Who’s Who” of 
Holocaust era assets specialists and top experts on Nazi economic and financial policies:  
Jean-François Bergier, Georg Kreis, Jacques Piccard, Jakob Tanner, Joseph Voyame, 
Wladiyslaw Bartoszeski, Saul Friedländer, Harold James, Sybil Milton (later replaced by 
Helen B. Junz), and Joseph Voyame (later replaced by Daniel Thürer). Although the 
commission was called the Independent Commission of Experts, they were by no means 
given unrestricted free reigns in their research. First, commission members were placed under 
a duty of confidentiality and were not allowed to disclose any information gathered to any 
third party or person – in particular not to other historians. Second, they were financially 
dependent in their research endeavors on the Swiss government; they were also obligated to 
submit regular reports on their progress. Bergier, a prominent Swiss economic historian and 
the head of the ICE posed the question whether it was proper to allow only a limited amount 
of researchers access to the sources: “Is this not an infringement of freedom of research? I 
think not, provided that reasonable use is made of this unusual privilege, and that use 
includes taking account of the general interest; exceptional situations call for exceptional 
means.”105 The commission however, was unrestricted in establishing its own methods of 
inquiry and its choice of members. 
 In 2002, the ICE at last issued its final report. The group of international Holocaust 
era experts addressed in the massive 597-page report Switzerland’s role during World War II. 
Individual chapters discussed Swiss refugee policy, foreign trade relations, asset transactions, 
as well as law and legal practices in dealing with issues of property rights and restitution in 
the post-war period.  
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 The results of the painful 2002 ICE report undoubtedly marked a paradigm shift in 
Switzerland’s historical memory of World War II. In its final report, it came to the following 
basic conclusions: 
1. By sending thousands of Jewish refugees back to its borders, Switzerland willy nilly 
contributed its share to the Nazi’s extermination campaign: “… by progressively 
closing the borders, delivering captured refugees over to their persecutors, and 
adhering to restrictive principles for far too long, the country stood by as many people 
were undoubtedly driven into certain death. In this way Switzerland contributed to the 
Nazi’s success in achieving their goals.”106 
2. The Swiss government was not substantially involved in the gold transactions with 
Nazi Germany: “The Federal Council did nothing to obtain any information about this 
[the gold transaction with the Reichsbank], and left the fundamental political 
decisions to the Swiss National Bank (SNB).”107 The Swiss government looked away 
when it came to gold transactions with Nazi Germany. 
3. It cannot be proven that Switzerland’s economic relations with Nazi Germany 
prolonged the war: “The theory which maintains that the services, exports, and loans 
provided by Switzerland influenced the course of the war to a significant degree could 
not be substantiated. This has less to do with a general ‘insignificance’ of Swiss 
exports and financial centre services than with the enormous economic dimensions of 
this war and the multifarious factors which determined the war economy and the 
unfolding of events on the front.”108 
4. Switzerland and certain Swiss individuals did benefit financially from the war: 
“Although the ICE was able to document specific cases, it was impossible to come to 
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any quantitative conclusions. But it is beyond doubt that these transactions 
substantially benefited the “middlemen”… As a neutral country which had been 
spared the ravages of war, it certainly had a competitive advantage.” 
5. Switzerland violated its neutrality by working together with the Axis powers during 
World War II and admitted to have been ‘sitting on the fence’: “Switzerland did not 
always strictly fulfil its duties under the neutrality law. Violations occurred in the 
export and inadequate monitoring of the transit of war materials and also in the 
granting of loans to Germany and Italy for use in the war economy. Switzerland often 
hid behind its neutrality and this same neutrality was improperly invoked to justify 
not only decisions made in all kinds of spheres, but also inaction on the part of the 
State.”109 
The crisis of the 1990s resulted in Switzerland paying billions of Swiss francs in 
compensations to the victims of the Holocaust who had been affected by the Swiss 
unwillingness of making public thousands of unclaimed assets parked in Switzerland’s 
vaunted financial institutions during the war. This resulted in a dramatic paradigm shift 
regarding the memory of the war. A whitewashed memory that had been cultivated and 
safeguarded for almost five decades was replaced by a more complex and honest perspective 
on the events of the war.  
 Although the government had accepted this new and more complex memory of the 
war, the reactions of the Swiss population were, and still are, ambiguous: “The destruction of 
dear beliefs, furthermore, alienated many citizens from the political establishment who has 
largely endorsed the new interpretations. Widespread frustration eventually benefited the 
national-conservative right, with the Schweizerische Volkspartei (People’s Party) becoming 
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the strongest force on the federal level.”110 In response to the ICE, organizations like the 
Arbeitskreis Gelebte Geschichte (research group living history) or the umbrella association 
Interessengemeinschaft Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg (joint venture Switzerland – Second 
World War) emerged, which made it their mission to “support people and publications, which 
provide a certain balance to the trend of discrediting Switzerland and the wartime generation. 
The joint venture resists the further demolishment of Switzerland’s reputation.”111 It is an 
ongoing challenge for the Swiss people to integrate such a rich and manifold memory into 
their public memory culture and create an edifying but still truthful identity that people 
embrace and can live with. Switzerland, at last, is mastering its World War II past. 
6. Conclusion 
“Every nation and every country feeds on its myths. The function of the historian 
is not to destroy the myths. The only effect of that is to reproduce the myth in 
negative form, to create an anti-myth. In any case, the operation generally proves 
futile. The fact is that myths have their own existence, and though the assaults of 
historical logic may disturb that existence they cannot destroy it.”112 
Over the second half of the 20h century, the Swiss government and a small group of key 
government figures, such as Petitpierre, General Guisan, and Bonjour worked hard to 
integrate Switzerland’s experience of World War II into a constructed and well-protected 
national self-image. The historical memory of the war became a keystone in maintaining 
Switzerland’s image as well-fortified, humanitarian, and neutral country in the heart of 
Europe. Over the years, first artists and intellectuals and then also a younger generation of 
historians attempted to paint a more realistic and truthful picture of Switzerland’s role during 
the war. But it was not until the 1990s that the Swiss myths were seemingly shattered through 
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external pressure after the revelation of the dormant accounts in Swiss banks of Holocaust era 
victims. I agree with Jean-François Bergier when he says that the existence of historical 
myths cannot be destroyed, although it seems like this happened during the 1990s. What first 
and foremost suffered during the 1990s was Swiss national pride. Not unlike the Americans, 
Swiss people are exceedingly proud of their country, its prosperity, natural beauty, and 
relative isolation from the world. For decades, Swiss people were used to sit on their 
“balcony over Europe,” cultivating their high living standards and being pleased with their 
proud civic culture. With the recent deconstruction of their treasured national World War II 
myths, and the revelation of parts of their history clashing with their self-image, Switzerland 
seemed to lose some of its identity. What happened in 1996 split a whole nation into two 
camps: the self-styled “patriots” adhered to the old myths, and the “progressives” (or in some 
people’s view, the “traitors”) accepted the darker aspects of the Swiss past. Switzerland will 
have to find a way how to live with the memory of their past and how to include it into their 
national identity. The International Commission of Experts, called into existence by the Swiss 
government in 1996, accused the country of having breached its neutrality and neglected its 
humanitarian duty during the war. This rung in a necessary paradigm shift in the way the 
collective national memory of the war was handled. The ICE’s critical findings of 
Switzerland´s role during World War II will hopefully encourage more open discourses on 
the country’s past in the future. The ICE report was a major step towards Switzerland at last 
beginning to master its complex and ambiguous World War II past. 
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